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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
earlier decision.1 4  Such failure to establish clearly the extant law
results in improvident confusion.
Since the Court has held that recrimination is not an absolute bar
to divorce but that final decision is dependent upon public policy,
public welfare, and the exigencies of the case,' 5 it is unfortunate that
the present case sets out no clear statement as to precisely when the
comparative rectitude doctrine is to be applied in Florida today.
MARJORIE SEWELL HOLT
ELECTION OF REMEDIES: ACTION OF DECEIT AS A BAR TO
SUBSEQUENT ACTION OF GENERAL ASSUMPSIT
Marks v. Fields, 36 So.2d 612 (Fla. 1948)
Plaintiffs leased a vacant lot from defendants to be utilized in the
sale of used automobiles. Defendant lessors orally represented that the
city zoning ordinances did not prohibit such use of the property. After
acceptance of the lease, plaintiffs discovered the representation to be
false and brought an action in deceit. At the trial, after introduction of
their testimony, plaintiffs submitted to a non-suit and, over defendants'
objection, were permitted to file instanter an amended declaration for
money had and received. From a judgment for plaintiffs the defendants
appealed, and the Court held that plaintiffs' declaration in deceit
constituted an election between inconsistent remedies, precluding subse-
quent action in general assumpsit. Judgment reversed. On rehearing,'
HELD, there was no election of remedies, for plaintiffs did not, in fact,
have a remedy in deceit. Judgment affirmed, Chief Justice Thomas,
Justice Sebring and Associate Justice White dissenting.
The doctrine of election of remedies provides that whenever a party,
by electing a remedy, assumes the existence of a particular status he
cannot afterward pursue another remedy involving assumption of an
inconsistent position.2 It is evident that deceit and general assumpsit
"'Hatfield v. Hatfield, 213 Mich. 368, 181 N. W. 968 (1921).
'Stewart v. Stewart, 158 Fla. 326, 29 So.2d 247 (1947).
'36 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1948).
'State v. Panama City, 126 Fa 776, 171 So. 760 (1937); Weeke v. Reeve, 65
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are inconsistent remedies, since deceit involves an affirmance of a trans-
action voidable for fraud,3 whereas general assumpsit is based upon a
disaffirmance of the transaction.4 In deceit the plaintiff elects to take
his benefits under the contract, asking damages for the loss of bargain5
occasioned by the fraud. On the other hand, in an action of general
assumpsit the plaintiff relinquishes his benefits under the contract and
asks restitution of his consideration. 6 The prosecution of an action in
deceit, in addition to being a technical election of remedies, constitutes
an election of substantive rights in that it is an affirmation of such rights
predicated on ratification of the voidable contract.7 In applying the
doctrine, however, the courts have not maintained this distinction between
the choice of alternative substantive rights and the doctrine of election
of remedies as formulated in adjective law.
The original purpose of this doctrine was the prevention of double
recovery for a single wrong. 8 From this modest beginning, dogmatic
adherence to the rule has become more important than the purpose
it sought to accomplish. 9 Many jurisdictions hold the mere commence-
ment of an action in deceit to be a conclusive election, precluding subse-
quent action for restitution.' 0  To avoid the harsh results in cases
in which wrongdoers have escaped making amends through the appli-
cation of the doctrine, the Florida Court has restricted its application.
Thus it has been held that a futile attempt to enforce a remedy that the
Fla. 374, 61 So. 749 (1913); McKinnon v. Johnson, 59 Fla. 332, 52 So. 288 (1910);
American Process Co. v. Florida White Pressed Brick Co., 56 Fla. 116, 47 So. 942
(1908).
'Willis v. Fowler, 102 Fla. 35, 136 So. 358 (1931); Firstbrook v. Buzbee, 101 Fla.
876, 132 So. 673 (1931); Beers v. Atlas Assurance Co., 231 Wis. 361, 285 N. W. 794
(1939).
'Norris v. Eikenberry, 103 Fla. 104, 137 So. 128 (1931); Cox v. Grose, 97 Fla.
848, 122 So. 513 (1929).
'Williams v. McFadden, 23 Fla. 143, 1 So. 618 (1887). But cf. Tedder v. Riggin,
65 Fla. 153, 61 So. 244 (1913).
'See CRAmDAL, FLORIDA Commou LAW PRACTICE 210, 211 (1928).
'See RESTATEzmNT, CONTRACTS §484.
8First Nat. Bank v. Flynn, 190 Minn. 102, 250 N. W. 806 (1933); Note, 36 HAnv.
L. Rzv. 593 (1923).
'Deinard and Deinard, Election of Remedies, 6 Mum. L. REv. 341, 480 (1922).
"°Wheeler v. Dunn, 13 Colo. 428, 22 Pac. 827 (1889); Donovan v. Curts, 245
Mich. 348, 222 N. W. 743 (1929); Davis v. Schmidt, 126 Wis. 461, 106 N. W. 119
(1906); see Note, 123 A. L. R. 386. But see Smith v. Bricker, 86 Iowa 285, 53 N. W.
250 (1892); Loomis v. Pease, 234 Mass. 101, 125 N. E. 177 (1919); First Nat. Bank
v. Flynn, 190 Minn. 102, 250 N. W. 806 (1933).
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plaintiff never possessed will not bar a later assertion of an inconsistent
remedy that does exist."- This limitation upon the doctrine is reason-
able, since obviously more than one remedy must actually exist as a
prerequisite to any possibility of election.' 2 The burden of proving
the availability of the remedy first sought is upon the party asserting
the bar of previous action.' 3
The holding in the principal case falls clearly within the foregoing
limitation upon the doctrine. In truth the plaintiffs did not have a
remedy in deceit, because the fraud alleged was a misrepresentation of
law, not of fact-for whatever this illogical but ancient distinction may be
worth. 14 The misconceived action in deceit was not prosecuted to judg-
ment; therefore it was not a bar to the inconsistent remedy for money
had and received, based upon the alleged failure of consideration. The
question of ratification as an election of substantive right was dealt
with only indirectly in relation to the inconsistency of the remedies. Had
it been raised directly, the same result might have been reached by the
reasoning of Justice Cardozo in the Schenck case,' 5 holding that before
judgment the mere prosecution of an action in deceit is by itself in-
effective to establish a final election between remedies or a conclusive
ratification of the voidable transaction, since the plaintiff in deceit has
impliedly conditioned his affirmance upon recovery of damages.
Considerable difference of opinion exists as to whether the bar
presented by the doctrine is based upon estoppel or upon waiver of
right.' 6 It has been proposed that an estoppel in pais be required to
establish a conclusive election.' 7 The legal writers almost unanimously
disapprove the doctrine,' 8 while the courts continue to observe it,
"1 Williams v. Robineau, 124 Fla. 422, 168 So. 644 (1936); Seaboard A. L. Ry.
v. Hartline, 84 Fla. 133, 92 So. 813 (1922); Capitol City Bank v. Hilson, 64 Fla.
206, 60 So. 189 (1912) ; Hays v. Weeks, 57 Fla. 73, 48 So. 997 (1909).
1 2Malsby v. Gamble, 63 Fla. 508, 57 So. 687 (1912).
"Cf. Brodkey v. Lesser, 157 S. W. 457 (Tex. 1913).
"Metzger v. Baker, 93 Colo. 165, 24 P.2d 748 (1933); PROSSER, HAEmBooX ON
TORTS §89 (1941) ; Note, 32 COL. L. Rav. 1018 (1932).
"Schenck v. State Line Tel. Co., 238 N. Y. 308, 144 N. E. 592 (1924); see Mr.
Justice Brandeis, dissenting in United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U. S. 290
(1922); RESTATEmENT, REsTITUTION §§68, 145, 146 (1937).
"Cf. Flynn-Harris-Bullard Co. v. Hampton, 70 Fla. 231, 70 So. 385 (1915); First
Nat. Bank v. Flynn, 190 Minn. 102, 250 N. W. 806 (1933); BIGELoW ON ESTOPPEL
673 (5th ed. 1890).
"7 Comment, 34 YALE L. J. 665 (1925).
"Davidson, Proposal to Abolish the Doctrine of Election of Remedies, 13 ORE.
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